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ABSTRACT 
 
In this research report I address the question:  “Are acts of the ritual slaughter of 
animals, of the kind recently engaged in by the Yengeni family, morally 
justifiable?”  
  
Using the Yengeni incident as a springboard for my discussion, I focus on the 
moral question of the relative weight of two competing ethical claims.  I weigh 
the claim that we have an obligation not to cause animals unnecessary pain 
against the claim by cultures that traditional practices, such as the one under 
discussion, are morally justifiable on the basis of the moral goods obtained 
through cultural identification and participation.   
 
I attempt to show that claims justifying practices on the basis of culture are not 
strong enough to outweigh the prima facie wrong of causing non-human 
animals unnecessary pain.   
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1.   Introduction 
 
The ritual slaughter of a bull as a traditional cleansing ceremony for the family 
of Tony Yengeni after his release from prison occasioned much public and 
media debate.  Animal rights and anti-cruelty proponents raised concerns about 
how the animal was killed, claiming that the action constituted cruelty, and 
transgressed anti-cruelty laws.  In response, others claimed that such practices 
are a fundamental part of the culture of some groups in South Africa, essential 
to their sense of identity, and as such should not be interfered with.   
 
This incident highlights two contentious trends in current normative ethical 
debate.  On the one hand, there have been growing calls for more ethical 
treatment of animals, for some animals, at least, to be accorded some value as 
objects of moral consideration, and even for animals to be understood as 
possessing rights.    On the other hand, in an increasingly multicultural context, 
many call for stronger measures to ensure the protection of minority or 
disadvantaged cultures against the encroachment of more dominant cultures.  
Appeals are made for special protective measures and legislation, and again, 
some even claim the existence of cultural rights.  On a popular level, frequent 
moral appeals are made to culture as providing a justificatory basis for 
particular practices.   
 
This incident also brings to the fore a crucial metaethical debate.  Moral 
relativism is a clear candidate for a position which could provide a defence for 
the claim that ritual animal sacrifice, even if involving suffering for animals, is 
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morally justified.  Since moral relativism makes morality contingent upon what 
is deemed to be moral within one’s own group, it could justify the claim that 
ritual slaughter is morally justifiable within a culture that believes it is so.  
Clearly, this is also a highly contentious position. 
 
The extent of the public debate over the Yengeni ritual slaughter  indicates that 
all of the above areas of ethical debate are pertinent in the South African 
context.  What makes this incident particularly interesting is that it pits claims 
of moral concern for animals against claims for the moral defence of a 
traditional practice on (human) cultural grounds.  Since both kinds of claim are 
contentious, calculating the relative moral weight of the claims against each 
other is no easy task.  In this paper I shall attempt to do just that.   
 
The question I  address is the following:  “Are acts of the ritual slaughter of 
animals, of the kind recently engaged in by the Yengeni family, morally 
justifiable?”  
 
I only invoke the Yengeni incident as an instance of a particular kind of moral 
issue based in a cultural ritual involving animal sacrifice that arguably causes 
animals suffering.  The specific details of the Yengeni incident are only 
pertinent inasmuch as they highlight the moral questions implicit in similar 
situations.   Whilst I will devote some attention to the specifics of this case,  my 
intention is merely to use this case as a basis for discussing the moral 
justifiability of ritual slaughters of this kind. Clearly this discussion could have 
implications for  similar practises such as kosher or halal slaughter, but I do not 
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intend specifically to consider these.  Further, I shall focus on the issues raised 
by the method of slaughter, and of causing pain to animals, and not on the 
distinct question of the permissibility of killing animals.  My interest is in 
whether it is justified to cause an animal pain or distress in the process of a 
ritual slaughter, and not whether taking the lives of animals is itself morally 
justified. 
 
A disproportionate degree of the media discussion about the Yengeni slaughter 
was centred on the legality or illegality of the act.  By contrast, I intend to 
address the moral questions underlying this debate.  This excludes from my 
scope specific attention to the question of what the appropriate role of the law 
or public policy should be in cases such as this.  My question focuses on the 
moral justifiability of such acts, not on whether they should be legal or whether 
they should be tolerated by society.  I take these to be distinct issues.  It is 
possible to hold that an act is immoral without necessarily claiming that legal or 
social strictures should be employed to prevent it.   For example, many people 
hold the view that adultery is wrong, but would not necessarily want to see it 
criminalised. 
 
The central thesis I wish to defend is that ritual animal sacrifice of this kind is a 
prima facie wrong, since it causes animals unnecessary suffering.  By “prima 
facie wrong” I mean the kind of act which is normally wrong but which could, 
in certain circumstances, possibly be outweighed by other moral considerations 
which would render the act justified.  My position is that in rituals of this kind, 
claims based on the moral value of cultural identification or participation are, at 
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best, relatively weak moral claims, which are not able to outweigh the prima 
facie wrong of causing animals harm. 
 
I begin by looking at the specific case: the Yengeni ritual slaughter, providing 
an overview of the media debate occasioned by this incident, highlighting the 
claims and interests defended from both sides of the debate.  I attempt to use 
this case to identify the moral issues which are raised by ritual slaughter of this 
kind. 
 
I then turn my attention to the first normative ethical issue raised by this 
incident, namely the question of human moral obligation towards animals.  My 
whole argument is a non-starter if it can be shown that animals have no moral 
claim on humans at all.  If animals cannot be wronged, or, even if they can be, 
they are not wronged in this kind of ritual, then the matter is settled, and there is 
no question of a need to morally justify such acts on any other grounds.    I 
proceed by trying to show that some kind of consensus exists among 
philosophers that animals should not be needlessly caused to suffer by human 
beings.   
 
Having defended the position that it is immoral to harm animals without good 
reason, I still need to address two kinds of possible challenge to my contention 
that ritual slaughter of this kind is not morally justified.  The first is the 
metaethical challenge of moral relativism.  If moral relativism is correct, then 
there is no objective basis for a moral judgement of the kind I make - that 
animals should not be hurt unnecessarily - as all moral judgements are 
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culturally relative.  I shall attempt to show that this position is flawed and 
untenable and unable to provide reasonable grounds for ruling out objective 
cross-cultural moral judgements. 
 
With the challenge of relativism set aside, I still need to consider another 
normative ethical claim that could potentially challenge my contention that 
ritual slaughter is not morally justifiable.  Behind much of the public debate 
about the legality of the Yengeni ritual is an underlying contention that even if 
it is a prima facie wrong to cause suffering to animals, this wrong is outweighed 
by the moral values intrinsic in participation in cultural practices.  I  consider 
the views of those who argue for the “Politics of Difference”.  Much of this 
philosophical debate centres on issues of legal accommodation and tolerance of 
cultures, but I focus on the underlying claims that belonging to and participating 
in a culture constitutes a moral good for those involved.  I suggest that some 
claim by cultures for their traditional practices to be morally defensible on the 
grounds of culture seems reasonable and just, but that no cultural practice can 
necessarily be morally justified on such grounds alone. 
 
If it is a prima facie wrong to cause animals unnecessary suffering, and if 
cultural practices themselves have a moral value for those who practice them, 
then I am left with having to weigh up the relative importance of these 
competing moral claims.  This will be my primary project in this paper, and will 
be the focus of the rest of my discussion. 
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In attempting to weigh up these competing moral claims, I  begin by 
considering the analogous situation in which established human rights (for 
women) come into conflict with cultural claims. I argue that when women’s 
interests in not being killed, physically harmed or abused come into conflict 
with claims based in culture, moral claims based on established cultural practice 
carry less weight than the competing claims.  I then extend this line of 
argument, attempting to apply it to cases where the moral obligation not to harm 
animals conflicts with moral values related to the practice of cultural rites, 
arguing similarly that the cultural claims are outweighed.  I  defend this by 
considering the typical moral values or social goods understood to be derived 
from cultural participation, and argue that taking moral exception to any one 
particular cultural practice does not constitute significantly denying these goods 
to those who perform this practice.  I conclude that the moral value or social 
goods derived form cultural practice are not significant enough to outweigh the 
prima facie wrong of harming animals in ritual sacrifices. 
 
Finally, I attempt to counter a number of objections to my argument.   Firstly, I 
address the possible objection that my analogy with women’s interests is 
inappropriate since this situation compares one set of human interests against 
another, whereas the question under consideration pits human interests against 
animal interests.  Some might contend that in such situations, human interests 
always take precedence.  I shall attempt to show that this is not so. Secondly, I 
consider the objection that sometimes weighty human interests may require that 
some animals are caused to suffer.  I consider experimentation on animals for 
medical purposes as a possible example of this.   I argue that human interests in 
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avoiding death and serious illness might be weighty enough to justify some 
harm to animals, but that the kinds of human interests which are promoted by 
cultural participation are not.  Thirdly, I counter a possible objection that I have 
missed the point of the real value of this sort of ritual in the lives of those who 
participate in it.  Participants may indeed experience enormous spiritual or 
psychological relief, or even healing, through these acts.  However, such 
symbolic acts could easily be modified to exclude harm to animals and still 
provide equally meaningful psychological or spiritual relief to participants.  
And finally, I counter an objection that the embeddedness of the act within a 
cultural context changes the meaning of the act itself, rendering it morally 
justifiable.  In the absence of a strong, reasoned argument in support of such a 
position in cases such as this, I argue that this objection does not appear to hold 
water. 
 
I conclude that even though cultures have a legitimate claim to obtaining the 
social goods and value derived from their cultural identification and 
participation, this claim does not morally outweigh the obligation not to cause 
sentient beings unnecessary suffering.  Acts of ritual sacrifice, of the kind 
performed by the Yengeni family, which cause animals suffering are morally 
wrong, even when they are part of an important cultural ritual.   
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2.   The Specific Case: Yengeni’s Ritual Slaughter 
 
I turn now to the specific incident which provides the basis for my project, the 
Yengeni ritual slaughter.  I have already stated that I use this case merely to 
highlight the moral issues involved in ritual slaughters of this kind.  The 
specific details of the case are, therefore, not that pertinent to my discussion.  
Nonetheless, I will provide a brief overview of the media debate resulting from 
this incident, in order to identify some relevant underlying moral issues which I 
will consider further. 
 
There are two general points about my use of this specific case that I need to 
make before proceeding, however.  Firstly, it is clear that rituals of this nature 
are a fairly common occurrence in South Africa.  It is obvious that the media 
attention given to this case was at least, in part, due to the high profile of Tony 
Yengeni, and his controversial recent past.  My intention is not to add to what 
may be argued to be unfair attention given to this specific case, given that most 
rituals of this type occur without public debate.  The specific case, and the 
resulting debate merely serve to highlight the moral controversies involved in 
cases of this type. 
 
Secondly, it is not germane to my argument whether or not actual pain was 
caused to the animal during the particular instantiation of this practice which is 
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under discussion – the Yenegeni ritual.  Indeed, some claimed that Yengeni 
merely prodded the bull with a traditional spear, and that it emitted a belching 
sound, so no cruelty was involved. (IOL, “SPCA Invited to Ceremonial 
Slaughter”, 28 January 2007). That may have been so, but it is nonetheless 
unlikely that any kind of pre-stunning equipment was available to perform the 
actual slaughter.  Be that as it may, in rituals of this nature, the normal practice 
is that the animal needs to be wounded first, and cry out in some way, for the 
ritual to be performed correctly.  (See Welsch).  Hilton Rudnick describes the 
general practice as follows:   
…when such a ritual is to be performed, the head of the 
household… spends some time loudly praising the ancestors. 
He selects a beast and tells the ancestors which animal is to be 
sacrificed.  The types of animals used are those that make the 
most noise whilst dying, generally cattle or goats, as the crying 
animal indicates the ancestors’ approval…. The slaughter is 
done with a sacrificial spear, and homage is paid to the 
ancestor whilst the beast lies bellowing on the ground. Once 
dead it is skinned, and some sections are separated so that the 
ancestors may take of their share first. Some of this is burned. 
(Rudnick: 57).  
Whether or not this procedure was followed in this specific case is not relevant, 
as most rituals of this nature would cause pain to the animal, so that the kind of 
moral conflict I am intending to highlight remains valid. 
 
10 
In January 2007, shortly after the release of Tony Yengeni from prison, the 
South African media began reporting that he and his family had participated in a 
cultural cleansing ceremony which involved the ritual slaughter of a bull.  One 
of the early articles, in the Cape Argus, reported:  “A bull and two sheep were 
slaughtered on Friday as scores of Tony Yengeni's friends, relatives and 
comrades gathered… to welcome him home following his release from prison.... 
[T]he slaughter [was] completed by a group of young men after Yengeni had 
first stabbed the bull with his family's traditional spear….”  (Gophe).  Shortly 
thereafter, it was reported that the SPCA was considering taking legal action 
against Yengeni, on the grounds that the slaughter contravened the Animal 
Protection Act.  (Williams & Prince).  On January 24th Allan Perris of the SPCA 
was reported as saying: “The SPCA's concern is the manner in which the 
animals are handled and treated before the slaughter. The circumstances under 
which this animal was slaughtered, and not the practice of animal slaughter, is 
the focus of our investigation.”  (Ka Nzapheza). 
 
This occasioned feverish public debate in the media.  Many claims were made 
that this is a traditional cultural practice, and that it should be allowed to 
continue without interference. A spokesperson for the Arts and Culture Minister 
was quoted as saying: 
 This is definitely not an SPCA matter, because it is not about 
cruelty to animals.  Instead, it is about man's search for 
meaning, purpose and the redefinition of the relationship with 
the cosmos, God and his ancestry…. It is the constitutional 
right of all indigenous families and communities to perform 
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rituals that reconnect them to their ancestors. That promotes 
peace of mind in their lives.... The department upholds this 
right…to practise their own cultural rituals…. [I]n the Yengeni 
family case, we observe what could easily pass for selective 
racism that condemns the practice of African rituals….  [T]he 
criticism is based on ignorance, contempt and lack of respect 
for African culture.   (IOL: “Yenegeni Ritual Spearheads 
Cultural Row”, 23 January 2007). 
 
ANC provincial secretary Mcebisi Skwatsha was quoted as saying: "The SPCA 
is very, very insensitive to the culture of African people. It's very, very 
important. It's fundamental to your being.… We African people will practise 
our culture and no one under the sun will ever stop us. This is part of our being 
human.” (IOL: “Yenegeni Ritual Spearheads Cultural Row”, 23 January 2007). 
The South African Human Rights Commission also defended Yengeni:   
Allegations of animal cruelty against… Yengeni can not be 
dealt with simply using criminal law.… The Commission's 
perspective is that one cannot take a simplistic approach to 
matters like this. It goes to the very heart of how people define 
themselves and how we construct our identity…. Rather than 
simply using criminal law, we would urge the SPCA to engage 
in a public debate around the issue relating to culture and 
cultural liberty and... the SPCA's mandate to prevent cruelty to 
animals…. [T]he slaughter of animals by cultures in South 
Africa [is] an issue that need[s] to be dealt with in context…. 
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Cultural liberty is an important right as well as recognised in 
South Africa... and internationally.”  (IOL, “Yengeni Animal 
Slaughter Not Criminal – SAHRC”, 23 January 2007). 
 
The vehemence of the reaction to the SPCA’s  intention possibly to prosecute 
Yengeni brought to the fore the deep sensitivities of some South Africans 
regarding freedom to practice their culture.  Emotive claims of racism and 
disrespect for African culture (though hardly substantiated), and claims that 
such cultural practices enjoy the protection of the Constitution, and should not 
be dealt with using criminal law, highlighted how strongly some elements of 
society felt with regard to their freedom to participate in a traditional cultural 
practice.  
 
The media also reported the views of other animal rights activists, who argued 
that culture should not be used as a defence of cruelty to animals.  Michelle 
Pickover was quoted as saying:   
Cannibalism, infanticide, female circumcision, slavery, 
suppression of women, exploitation of children, ritual 
slaughter, bull fighting, bear baiting, fox hunting... are among 
so-called 'cultural traditions' practised by some groups - the 
loss of which should not be mourned…. There is an epidemic 
of violence against other animals and as individuals and a 
society, degrading practices and exploitative traditions need to 
13 
be challenged.  (IOL, “Tradition No Excuse for Cruelty”, 26 
January 2007). 
This brief overview of the media debate surrounding this incident shows that 
much of the public discussion centred around the question of the legality of the 
act.  Anti-cruelty champions argued that the act contravened existing legislation;  
their opponents claimed that rituals of this kind should either be lawful, or fall 
outside of the scope of the law.  Even if not explicitly stated, though, both sides 
of the debate implicitly make moral claims.  It is reasonable to assume that 
friends of anti-cruelty suppose that this practice should be unlawful because 
they believe it to be immoral.  On the other side, appeals for tolerance of these 
practices, based on contentions that such rituals are exceptionally meaningful to 
those who practice them and go to the very root how people define and identify 
themselves and find meaning and purpose in their lives, point to a claim that 
participation in these rituals has a moral value of its own.   I have already stated 
that I wish to exclude questions of legality from my discussion.  My position 
differs from that of the SPCA.  I am not interested in whether or not ritual 
slaughter is legal; I am interested in whether it can be morally justified.  I am 
also not interested in whether or not cultural practices of this nature should be 
legally protected, or socially tolerated.  Rather, I wish to question whether moral 
value can be located in the practice of cultural rituals themselves, and if so, 
whether this moral value is significant enough to outweigh the competing claim 
that animals should not be unnecessarily hurt.  So, my focus will be on 
considering the moral claims implicit in the arguments from both sides of the 
debate, and on weighing them up against each other.   
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3.   The Case for Animals 
 
If there is nothing wrong in harming animals, then my argument fails to get off 
the ground at all.  So, I now turn my attention to the issue of human moral 
obligations towards animals.  As stated earlier, my concern in this paper is not 
with whether killing animals is justified, but, rather, on the distinct issue of 
whether causing them to suffer is justified. 
 
The issue of moral obligations towards animals has been the subject of much 
debate in recent decades.  From those who claim that other animals have no 
moral status, to animal rights activists who seem to see almost no difference 
between the moral status of humans and animals, an enormous variety of 
positions has been expressed.  For the sake of my argument, all I need to show 
is that, minimally, humans have a moral obligation not to cause animals to 
suffer unnecessarily.   
 
The main issues in this debate concern the moral status of animals, (for instance, 
since animals are not moral agents, can they deserve moral consideration?) as 
well as whether, if humans do have duties to animals, these are direct duties (i.e. 
we can wrong animals themselves) or indirect duties (we somehow wrong other 
humans by mistreating animals).  I do not propose to deal with these issues in 
any detail.  Rather, I hope to show that some degree of consensus exists, and 
that even those philosophers who have argued strongly against animals having 
rights or humans having direct duties towards animals, generally assert that 
gratuitous or unnecessary cruelty towards animals should be avoided. 
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Of the philosophers who adopt a strong position in favour of animals having 
moral status, Peter Singer is one of the most well-known.  He argues that 
traditional views on how animals should be treated constitute speciesism, which 
like racism and sexism is indefensible.  For Singer, species membership alone 
does not provide adequate grounds for treating the moral interests of other 
beings any differently from those of human beings.  From a preference 
utilitarian position, he contends that animals have a preference not to suffer, and 
even to remain alive.  Not only does he assert that we have a duty not to cause 
animals unnecessary pain, he argues that we have a duty not to take the lives of 
animals without good reason. (Singer, 1993).   He writes:  “If a being suffers, 
there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into 
consideration.  No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality 
requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering – in so far 
as rough comparisons can be made – of any other being.”  (Singer, 1979: 50). 
 
Tom Regan strongly defends the position that animals have rights, and that 
humans have corresponding obligations towards animals.  He argues from a 
deontological position, and asserts that animals have intrinsic value since they 
are what he calls the “subject of a life”.  He suggests that the similarities, and 
not the differences, between humans and many classes of animals are what 
really count.   
The basic similarity is simply this: we are each of us the 
experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an 
individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our 
usefulness to others.  We want and prefer things, believe and 
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feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions 
of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and 
suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued 
existence and our untimely death – all make a difference to our 
quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as 
individuals.  (Regan, 1989: 111-112).   
These things constitute being a subject of a life, and qualify those who possess 
them as having intrinsic value and rights.  Clearly, his position supports the 
claim that animals should not be caused unnecessary pain. 
 
T.M. Scanlon, in his book What We Owe to Each Other adopts a form of 
contractualism to provide grounds for what he believes our moral obligations 
are to one another.   Broadly, contractualist moral theories rely on the idea of 
some kind of social contract “agreed” between reasonable parties which 
establishes regulations for how people should behave towards one another.   
Accepting that contractualism typically struggles to account for moral 
obligations to those who do not possess the rational capacity to participate in 
negotiating a social contract (such as animals and mentally defective human 
beings), Scanlon suggests a possible solution.  He proposes that animals could 
be represented by “trustees” in the negotiation of a contract.  This device would 
allow for his contractualist theory to account for the intuition that animals 
deserve moral consideration (Scanlon: 183-187).  I am unable to discuss the 
merits of his position here, but he, too, from a deontological perspective in the 
contractarian tradition states: 
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Given the plausible assumption that responding appropriately 
to the value of other creatures is part of morality in the broad 
sense, this accounts for the intuition that it is a serious moral 
failure to be indifferent to the suffering of nonhuman animals, 
and hence morally wrong in the broad sense of that term to 
cause them pain without moral justification. (Scanlon: 181). 
Thus, Scanlon too, asserts that animals should not be hurt unnecessarily. 
 
In discussing the historical development of the trend to accord moral status to 
animals, led largely by Singer and Regan, Lori Gruen writes:    
The ensuing discussion led to a general agreement that animals 
are not mere automata, that they are capable of suffering, and 
are due some moral consideration.  The burden of proof shifted 
from those who want to protect animals from harm to those 
who believe that animals do not matter at all.  The latter are 
now forced to defend their view against the widely accepted 
position that, at least, gratuitous animal suffering and death is 
not morally acceptable.  (Gruen: 343). 
Even if  it is true that the “burden of proof” now lies on the side of those who 
seek to deny animals moral status, this alternative position needs to be 
considered.  So I turn my attention now to some of the detractors who question 
those who argue strongly in support of the moral status of animals. 
 
Michael A. Fox has famously argued against the notion that animals have rights, 
directly challenging the views of Singer and Regan.  In his paper “Animal 
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Liberation: A Critique” he states his position thus:  “I shall argue… that the 
concept of moral rights cannot be extended to include animals, and that the 
question of animals’ rights is therefore a bogus issue.”  (Fox: 107).  He argues 
that only “…those beings which are members of a species of which it is true in 
general (i.e. typically the case at maturity, assuming normal development) that 
members of the species in question can be considered autonomous agents are 
beings endowed with moral rights.” (Fox: 112).  For Fox, this implies that only 
human beings can have rights.  He further states that this is so because only 
autonomous beings of the kind he describes can be part of a moral community 
in which the ideas of rights and duties can develop and make sense. (Fox: 112).  
Fox later recanted this position. (Gruen: 345).  But, even from his early position 
he writes: “We may and ought to be concerned about the welfare of animals and 
their present exploitation by man because they are sentient beings.” (Fox: 107),  
and “Undoubtedly animals should not be maltreated.  They should not be made 
to suffer needlessly or excessively.”  (Fox: 113).   
 
R.G. Frey tackles the question of animal rights and interests with the intention 
of refuting moral arguments for vegetarianism.  He argues strongly that animals 
cannot be said to have either interests or moral rights.  (Frey, 198: 166-167). 
But, even from this seemingly radical position he is able to state in his postscript 
to Interests and Rights: “I have allowed that the ‘higher’ animals can suffer 
unpleasant sensations and so, in respect of the distinction between harm and 
hurt, can be hurt; and wantonly hurting them, just as wantonly hurting human 
beings, demands justification, if it is not to be condemned.”  (Frey, 1980: 170). 
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Perhaps one of the strongest positions against according moral status to animals 
is that of Michael P.T. Leahy.  Arguing that animals lack the capacity for 
language, moral agency and self-consciousness and are thus not subjects of 
moral responsibility, he asserts,  
The key is the ability to use language; its importance in the 
equation has been spectacularly underestimated.  Without it 
there can be no recognition of entitlements, of give-and-take 
(this encapsulates moral agency), nor awareness of oneself as 
oneself.  Animals… are conscious… but self-consciousness… 
comes only with the capability of speech.    (Leahy: 255).   
These concepts form the basis of what amounts to a scathing attack on animal 
liberation positions in his book Against Liberation:  Putting Animals into 
Perspective  (Leahy: 255).   Nonetheless, even Leahy states: “All of this is 
perfectly compatible with our treating other creatures humanely and with 
respect and it is a sign of perverted human nature not to do so”. (Leahy: 253).   
Even more surprisingly he states:  “ This must not be seen as condoning the 
random killing of animals; far from it… our instinctive impulses to avoid 
cruelty will normally extend to their needlessly being killed. (That some people 
lack these impulses is normally grounds for criticism; we call them sadists, 
cruel, or, if it is by way of business, then merely hardened).”  (Leahy: 199).  
 
I have not tried to present a comprehensive philosophical defence of the 
position that the minimum moral obligation that humans owe to animals is that 
we should not cause them unnecessary and avoidable pain. Rather, I have 
pointed out that considerable agreement already exists among philosophers on 
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this question, even among those who are generally perceived to be in opposition 
to animal rights/liberation views, or positions that hold that animals have 
intrinsic value.   If, on the basis of this consensus, we do have a moral 
obligation not to cause animal suffering without good reason, then, on the face 
of it, animal ritual slaughter of the kind under discussion is morally wrong, 
since it causes unnecessary suffering to animals. 
 
It needs to be pointed out that, as far I am aware, nowhere in the media debate 
around the Yengeni incident did any of those who sought to defend the practice 
of the ritual slaughter attempt to do so by claiming that animals do not have a 
moral claim on human beings, or that it is not a prima facie wrong to cause 
animals suffering.  The defences launched all relied on some kind of counter-
claim based on culture.  So, it is possible that they, too, would not dispute the 
contention that we have an obligation not to cause animals unnecessary 
suffering.    I must still, however,  give attention to the counter-claims based on 
culture and specifically the challenges posed to my position by moral 
relativism, and by the moral good/values located in cultural participation and 
identification.  
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4.   The Case from Moral Relativism  
 
One obvious school of thought, which would defend the position that a 
particular act, which is an intrinsic part of a culture, would be morally justified, 
by virtue of its being part of that culture, is moral relativism.  In its strongest 
form, this position claims that what is right or wrong is relative to the culture of 
the person/s performing the act, or that there is no objective basis for making 
moral judgements across cultures.   On this view, then, the fact that an act is a 
standard part of a culture is enough to justify the act morally, within that culture 
(Gowans: Section 2).  The ritual slaughter under discussion would, thus, be 
morally justified within the culture of the Yengeni family.  This is a obviously a 
serious challenge to my argument, which I now intend to counter. 
 
The main challenge to address is metaethical in nature.  Gowans defines what is 
termed “Metaethical Moral Relativism” as follows:  “The truth or falsity of 
moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is 
relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.”  
(Gowans: Section 2).  He continues: “[T]he standards of justification in… 
societies may differ from one another, and…  there is no rational basis for 
resolving these differences.  This is why the justification of moral judgments is 
relative rather than absolute.”  (Gowans: Section 2).   
 
Clearly this position is open to many objections, and it is not possible within the 
scope of this paper to discuss these in detail.  I shall, however, give attention to 
two.  My main objection is that, on this view, certain acts which intuitively 
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seem very wrong, indeed, might be morally “justifiable”.  Few of us would be 
comfortable with the idea that ritual human sacrifice could be said to be morally 
justified on the grounds that it is part of the cultural practice of a particular 
people.  Female genital mutilation would also seem to most of us to be immoral, 
and the fact that such acts are an intrinsic part of particular cultures would not 
seem to provide moral justification for such acts.  James Rachels suggests that 
violent anti-semitism and apartheid could be justified on these grounds – 
something that I take it few of us would easily settle with.  (Rachels: 21-22). 
 
Secondly, as Rachels points out, if metaethical moral relativism is correct, the 
whole concept of moral development or progress and social reform in societies 
would become meaningless. (Rachels: 22-23). The practice of slavery in a 
previous age would then have to be understood as having been morally justified 
in its time.  The abolishment of slavery, child labour, and racial discrimination 
in some societies would no longer be able to be understood as moral progress or 
improvement.  More disturbing, if moral relativism were generally believed to 
be true, societies would become inherently conservative, and even static, as 
attempts to effect social change would be weakened by the belief that if society 
holds that current practice is moral, then it must be so.  Current struggles, such 
as those for greater rights and liberties for women and gays and lesbians in 
contexts in which these are still denied or circumscribed, would be weakened, 
creating a situation in which no development towards more just or equitable 
societies could easily occur.  
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Both of these consequences of moral relativism seem to be absurd, and 
untenable, as they fly in the face some of our most strongly felt moral intuitions.  
On these grounds, I submit that metaethical moral relativism is deeply flawed 
and cannot be reasonably substantiated. 
 
A second kind of challenge posed by relativism is normative in nature.  Gowans 
describes it as follows: 
…[T]he term ‘moral relativism’ is sometimes associated with 
a normative position concerning how we ought to think 
about, or behave towards, persons with whom we morally 
disagree.  Usually the position is formulated in terms of 
tolerance. In particular, it is said that we should not interfere 
with the actions of persons that are based on moral 
judgements we reject…  (Gowans, Section 2) 
Most often proponents of this position propose tolerance and non-interference in 
a legal or political sense.  They therefore appeal for social protection against 
interference in culturally sanctioned practices which others may believe to be 
wrong.  Much of the pro-culture side of the debate around the Yengeni incident 
was characterised by this sort of demand.  As I have excluded legal/political 
aspects from my discussion, I do not need to deal with this challenge here.  I am 
not claiming that ritual sacrifice should be prohibited.   
 
But it is also possible to frame this normative challenge in less political terms 
and to claim that it is wrong even to privately pass judgement or hold a negative 
moral opinion about the morality of the practices of other cultures.  Having 
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stated that I believe ritual sacrifice of the kind under discussion to be a prima 
facie wrong, I would clearly be guilty of this charge.  There is, however, a 
fundamental logical flaw to this sort of normative challenge.  If one holds the 
position that all moral judgements are true only in a relative sense, then so is the 
judgement that it is morally impermissible to pass judgement on the practices of 
another culture.  The relativist grounds for this kind of normative claim 
relativise the claim itself.  This is an obvious absurdity. 
  
David Wong, an ethicist widely recognised as a modern proponent of a more 
nuanced and sophisticated form of moral relativism, makes the point that 
relativism is generally negatively perceived, at least, in part, because it is often 
only the most extreme position, as described above, which is the subject of 
debate.  (Wong, 1993: 449).  Even as a celebrated proponent of relativism, 
Wong also rejects a simplistic form of metaethical relativism, proposing, 
instead, what he calls “pluralistic relativism”.  He describes his position as such:   
The version [of relativism] I defend constitutes an alternative to 
universalism and relativism as these views are usually defined.  
My alternative agrees with one implication of relativism as it is 
usually defined: that there is no single true morality.  However, it 
recognizes significant limits on what can be counted as a true 
morality.  There is a plurality of true moralities, but that plurality 
does not include all moralities.  This theory occupies the territory 
between universalism – the view that there is a single true 
morality – and the easy target typically defined as relativism: the 
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view that any morality is as good as any other.  (Wong, 2006: 
xii). 
Wong argues that there are two  basic functions that any moral code needs to 
fulfil.  Firstly, it must manage conflicts of interest between individuals and, 
secondly, it must manage internal conflicting wants and interests within an 
individual, which cannot all be satisfied simultaneously (Wong, 1993: 446).  
Moral systems develop in order to fulfil these two practical functions.  His 
argument is both sophisticated and reasonable, appealing to a form of naturalism 
to defend his position.  Wong sees the development of moral codes in 
evolutionary terms: they develop in order to satisfy the need for the inter- and 
intra-personal conflicts he describes to be effectively managed. (Wong, 2006:  
Chapter 2).  Wong suggests that different and even partially incompatible moral 
codes may be able to fulfil these functions equally well.  As long as a moral 
code satisfies the objective criteria of successfully managing these inter- and 
intra-personal conflicts, it is valid, even if it achieves this differently in different 
moral codes.   
 
It is important to observe that, however valid Wong’s position may or may not 
be, it does not possess the resources to deal with human obligations towards 
animals.  His entire concept of morality is focused on dealing with conflicts 
between and within human beings.  He proposes some kind of objective method 
of measuring the validity of differing moral codes,  but since this method relies 
on his assertion that valid moral codes need to manage inter- and intra-personal 
conflicts (both relating to humans) – it is hard to see how his position can 
26 
address moral questions relating to our responsibilities towards non-human 
animals. 
 
But what about the challenge of normative relativism?  Even as strong and 
sophisticated a defender of relativism as Wong rejects an extreme form of 
normative relativism, claiming that it is more reasonable “… to permit us to 
pass judgement on others with substantially different values.  Even if these 
values are justified as our own from some neutral perspective, we are still 
entitled to call bad or evil or monstrous what contradicts our most important 
values.” (Wong, 1993: 448).  Wong continues that how we should act on such 
judgements depends on the situation.  Mostly he believes we should express our 
judgement, but not try to enforce our values on others. However, he concedes 
that in a case such as the practice of human sacrifice, tolerance may be a less 
weighty consideration than the need to stop the practice.  (Wong, 1993: 448). 
 
Wong suggests that there is not one single objective morality, true for all 
people, but stops far short of giving blanket approval to all acts within a  culture 
simply because they are acceptable within that particular culture.  His 
characterisation of the functional purpose of morality is totally anthropocentric, 
and so provides little guidance for dealing with the question of moral concern 
for animals.  Yet, even he keeps open the possibility that some actions are so 
obviously wrong that culture cannot be used as a basis for their defence, as well 
as that there may be weighty enough moral issues that would permit us to judge 
the actions of others.  
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At most, Wong seems to believe that pluralistic relativism is sometimes able to 
provide grounds for asserting that acts are moral within a particular culture, 
even if they are immoral in another.  But he does not claim that culture provides 
sufficient grounds for the moral justification of actions.  Thus, not even Wong’s 
more convincing kind of relativism is able to provide grounds for morally 
justifying the maltreatment of animals in acts of ritual sacrifice.  I will similarly 
argue that culture alone cannot be used to morally jusify a particular act, 
especially if there are more morally weighty issues at stake. 
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5.   The Case from Cultural Identification 
 
Another area of thought which might be a candidate for morally justifying acts 
based on culture is located in a recent trend to assert that certain groups such  as 
cultural minorities, gays and lesbians, women and others may need special 
consideration, as individual human rights might not be enough to protect their 
interests.  Sometimes dubbed the “politics of recognition” or the “politics of 
difference”, the issues are most often located in the public realm, with a focus 
on how the special interests of groups might be promoted and recognised legally 
and structurally in society. In terms of cultural groups, it is often claimed that 
minority cultural groups are vulnerable to injustice, as they are expected to 
conform to the values and beliefs of a more dominant culture.  Regarding 
cultures that were once colonised, it is often suggested that their way of life was 
denigrated in the past, and that action needs to be taken to ensure that their 
traditions are now nurtured and protected.  (Heyes: Section 2). 
 
This is a large area of debate, with many nuances of opinion.  Some even go so 
far as to speak of cultural “rights”, and the need for legal and constitutional 
guarantees to protect and promote disadvantaged cultures.  Once again, much of 
the debate concerns issues of a political and legal nature: issues around 
tolerance and accommodation.  Since this is not the focus of my question, what 
is important to me are any underlying moral claims based on culture which this 
debate could bring to the fore. 
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Charles Taylor’s seminal essay “Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition” argues for the need, in multicultural societies, to go beyond what 
he calls the “politics of equal dignity”, protected by individual human rights, 
and to move towards the “politics of difference”, where the shared identities of 
members of cultures are nurtured, respected and protected.  This argument is 
based on the idea that the sense of identity which persons have is significantly 
grounded in their sense of belonging to a culture which has been instrumental in 
the formation of who they perceive themselves to be.  (Taylor: 30-36).   
With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant 
to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and 
immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked 
to recognise is the unique identity of this individual or group, 
their distinctiveness from everyone else.  The idea is that it is 
precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, 
assimilated to a dominant majority identity.  And this 
assimilation is a cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity.  
(Taylor: 38). 
 
Underlying a claim that the “politics of difference” must recognise the 
uniqueness of members of a specific group, as a group, is a belief that there are 
social goods important to the members of the group which cannot be obtained 
unless their distinct identity is recognised.  I take it that these social goods are 
located in the perceived value of belonging to a cultural group, of being able to 
identify oneself as part of the group, participate in its practices, etc.  For Taylor, 
this is conceived of in communitarian terms:  there is value in simply belonging 
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and identifying culturally, and people have an interest in obtaining these social 
goods.  Alternatively, others who argue for what may broadly be called the 
“politics of difference” do so from a more liberal perspective.  The social goods 
to be protected are located in individual self-respect, self-worth, autonomy, 
authentic selfhood, etc. that are derived from cultural identification and 
participation.  Will Kymlicka, a proponent of the liberal view, suggests that 
cultural identity grounds people’s individual sense of identity and provides the 
security obtained from a sense of safe “belonging”.  He continues, “But this in 
turn means that people’s self-respect is bound up with the esteem in which their 
national group is held.  If a culture is not generally respected, then the dignity 
and self-respect of its members will also be threatened.”  (Kymlicka: 7). 
 
The legal/political safeguards sought by those who argue for the “politics of 
difference” arise out of an underlying perception that there are morally 
significant values inherent in cultural belonging and identification which require 
protection.  Whether these are understood in communitarian terms or more 
individualistically is not relevant to my argument.  Those who argue in favour 
of ritual slaughter on the grounds of culture may wish to claim that the moral 
values identified as lying beneath the political claims of the friends of the 
“politics of difference” are significant enough to outweigh the prima facie 
wrong of ritual slaughter.  Members of those cultures who practice these rituals 
derive morally significant value in terms of their cultural identification, sense of 
belonging, or their self-esteem, dignity, and so forth, from being able to 
participate in their culture generally, and in their cultural practices in particular.  
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Obviously there are many who contest the view that cultures or other groups 
require any exceptional treatment, and believe that individual human rights are 
enough to ensure a fair society.  Many more would resist using the language of 
rights with respect to cultures.  However, the broad thrust of this position seems 
plausible enough.  In South Africa, with its colonial past, it is understandable 
that those whose culture was once denigrated, treated as inferior and 
“primitive”, would believe that for their dignity to be restored, their sense of 
cultural identification now needs to be affirmed and recognised.  It is 
understandable that they feel their sense of common identity within their culture 
to be an important interest and moral value.  Broadly, I have sympathy with 
such claims.  When one’s culture is treated as inferior, one is bound to feel this 
as a personal affront.  And it is unsurprising that with political liberty, African 
people have re-asserted their unique identity, and the values and practices of 
their cultures.  This makes the vehemence of the reaction against the SPCA in 
the Yengeni case understandable.   
 
It needs to be added that in the debate regarding the Yengeni ritual slaughter, 
appeals were often made to the South African Constitution as a defence of the 
practice.  I need, then, briefly to consider the grounds for these appeals.  The 
South African Constitution does provide for limited rights for cultural groups. 
Under the heading “Cultural, Linguistic and Religious Communities” Paragraph 
31 of the Bill of Rights states: 
1. Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic 
community may not be denied the right, with other members 
of that community   
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a. to enjoy their culture, practise their religion 
and use their language; and  
b. to form, join and maintain cultural, religious 
and linguistic associations and other organs of civil 
society.  
2. The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a 
manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.   
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa). 
It should be noted that subsection (2) of this paragraph limits these cultural 
“rights”, where they conflict with any other provisions of the Bill of Rights.  
Since animals are not covered by the Bill, however, this provision does not 
provide any guidance on how to deal with the case of ritual slaughter under 
consideration. 
 
However, as with the claims made for the “politics of difference”, underlying 
this Constitutional provision is an assumption that cultural identification and 
participation is a moral good. 
 
Notwithstanding all of the above, the fact that people may derive social goods 
such as identification, self-esteem, self-respect etc. from practicing their culture 
does not automatically grant moral legitimacy to any particular cultural practice.  
It may provide some grounds for arguing that a practice is morally justified, but 
not exhaustive or sufficient grounds.  My discussion of the claims made by 
proponents of the “politics of difference” has identified some of the possible 
moral claims which could be advanced on behalf of culture.   People’s sense of 
33 
identification as part of their culture is an important interest.  I have particular 
sympathy with indigenous cultural groups in South Africa, who endured long 
periods where their cultures were treated with disrespect, who now seek the  
restoration of their communal dignity, self-esteem, and shared identity in the 
ability to express their cultural identity.   
 
If this is so, I now need to consider whether my contention that ritual slaughter 
of animals is a prima facie wrong can be morally outweighed by the competing 
claim that there is moral value in human participation in cultural practices and 
in identification with one’s culture.   
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6.   Weighing Up the Competing Claims 
 
If I am right that we have a moral obligation not to cause unnecessary pain to 
other sentient creatures, and that most reasonable moral perspectives would 
agree that there is  such an obligation,  and if it is reasonable to accept a moral 
claim by cultural groups that cultural identification and participation can 
produce social goods which provide some justificatory grounds for their cultural 
traditions and norms, how can these conflicting claims be weighed up against 
each other morally?   
 
I shall proceed by considering an analogous case where claims based on culture 
come into conflict with other moral claims.  Elizabeth Zechenter, in her article 
“In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual”, 
considers situations in which established and generally accepted individual 
human rights come into conflict with the demands of culture.  In particular, she 
focuses on cultures which demand the “right” to treat women in ways which 
universal human rights would forbid.  She looks at two particular examples.  
The first deals with a young woman, encouraged by her late husband’s family, 
who committed Sati, once common in parts of India, in which widows were 
encouraged to throw themselves onto the burning funeral pyres of their late 
husbands, taking their own lives.  The second involves two Algerian girls who 
were raped and killed in front of their village, because they had disobeyed their 
Islamic leader who had decreed that no girls were to be educated.  Zechenter 
offers a detailed and compelling argument that in cases of this nature, claims to 
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a right to cultural practices simply cannot outweigh the competing established 
individual human rights of the women concerned.  (Zechenter: 327-332). She 
writes: 
There exist genuine differences among cultures, and not all 
such differences can easily be reconciled.  The universal 
human rights law represents an attempt to strike a proper 
balance between the rights of each individual culture to create 
its own moral and ethical norms and the needs of individuals to 
be protected against arbitrary and brutal customs and cultural 
practices.   (Zechenter:  342). 
 
My focus is not on rights, but on competing moral claims.  But, surely, it can be 
no more moral to rape and murder a woman because she has sought to be 
educated in one cultural context than it is in another.  Nor can culture or 
tradition morally justify encouraging women to commit suicide after the deaths 
of their husbands.  That an act is an established cultural practice, or tradition, 
intrinsic to a culture, cannot, on its own, provide sufficient grounds for its moral 
permissibility.  More compelling arguments need to be advanced.   If we were 
to believe that the moral values inherent in cultural identification  provide 
sufficient grounds for all cultural practices, we would  have to regard human 
sacrifice, female genital mutilation, the killing of female babies, slavery, torture 
and cannibalism as morally acceptable, within certain cultures.  Even if there is 
moral value in cultural identification and participation, it is hard to see how this 
can outweigh our obligation not to harm, abuse, torture, maim or kill others.  It 
is extremely counter-intuitive to claim that people’s interest in self-esteem, 
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belonging, identification, etc. can be more morally significant than other 
people’s interests in not being killed, physically harmed or abused.  The one 
kind of interest seems intrinsically more morally weighty than the other.  If 
there is any moral claim grounded in the practice of culture it can only be a 
relatively weak claim compared to claims that we are obliged not to cause 
physical harm to others. 
 
I am thus asserting that the moral contest here is between two very different 
kinds of interests.  And while both are valid, intuitively it seems that interests 
relating to safety, bodily integrity, survival, etc. are more morally significant 
than those relating to identification, self-respect etc.  But can this intuition be 
rationally supported?  If one were to imagine a situation in which a deeply 
emotionally damaged person would somehow be able to make great gains in her 
sense of self-esteem, and find some relief for her deep-set anger if she were able 
to participate in a therapy involving her physically assaulting another person, 
would the moral value of her progress towards emotional healing outweigh the 
prima facie wrong of harming another?  Unless the other person were a willing 
participant, it does not seem to me that this could be justifiable.   Interests may 
be morally significant, but not all interests carry the same moral weight.  That is 
the reason we intuitively think that a claim to the goods resulting from cultural 
identification cannot make it right to abuse or kill women in the name of 
culture.   
 
The issue of smoking tobacco in public spaces is another example which 
highlights the principle I am invoking.  Smokers may claim to have an interest 
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in smoking because of the pleasure it brings them.  But non-smokers also have 
an interest in preserving their physical health by not breathing in the tobacco 
smoke of others.  Since, where smokers and non-smokers share a physical 
space, it is impossible that both interests can be fulfilled, simultaneously, how 
can we decide which of these interests is of greater moral weight?   I contend 
that interests relating to survival, physical health, bodily integrity etc. must 
outweigh interests in pleasure.  Smokers should morally avoid smoking in 
public places because their interest in pleasure is not as morally significant as 
the interests of non-smokers to remain healthy.  Many kinds of interests and 
social goods may well be valid and morally considerable, but interests relating 
to survival, bodily integrity and health surely carry the greater moral weight. 
  
I submit that the same principle holds when it comes to our treatment of other 
sentient animals.  The essential wrongness of causing them pain deliberately 
and unnecessarily is in no way rendered less immoral because it is based in an 
established cultural or traditional practice.  If the defence for cultural practices 
is the need for identification, the promotion of self-esteem derived from a sense 
of belonging to a cultural group, and the other potential social goods to be 
obtained through the practice, these perceived human interests cannot be more 
morally significant than unnecessarily causing suffering to another sentient 
animal, any more than they could be to another human.  It seems reasonable to 
assert that obligations not to cause physical harm or pain to sentient beings 
outweigh the moral value inherent in cultural identification and participation, 
even when these are conceived of as an important element of the self-
identification of the culture concerned.  
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Clearly, this position would not be accepted by everyone.  So, I need to take one 
step back, and consider again the moral values inherent in cultural identification 
which I identified in the previous section.  It might be argued (in a way 
reminiscent of one of the claims of normative relativism) that if people were to 
negatively judge the practices of other cultures (even without advocating their 
social restriction) they could cause harm to the members of those cultures.  
Taking a negative stance towards a cultural practice could deny members of a 
culture some of the social goods which might be obtained through  their 
identification with and participation in their culture.   If someone says that what 
one does in one’s culture is wrong, they could challenge a fundamental part of 
one’s perceived identity, and possibly also one’s self-esteem, dignity, etc.   I 
have already stated that I have sympathy with the claim of previously 
disparaged cultures that they have a morally significant claim that their interests 
in identification and the recovery of their self-esteem be acknowledged.   
 
However, cultures are characterised by many different values, norms, practices, 
rites, and behaviours. To acknowledge and respect the interests of others 
derived from their cultural identification does not necessarily require that every 
one of the elements that contribute to that culture must necessarily be regarded 
as outside of the scope of moral judgement or criticism.  One can plausibly, 
broadly, respect the interests based in cultural identification of  many 
indigenous South  Africans, without granting that cultural practices involving 
animal suffering are morally justified.  One is not disallowing the importance of 
these interests if one takes issue with the morality of one particular cultural 
practice of a group.  Cultural identification is not based on any single practice, 
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but on many different elements.  The dignity and esteem of a cultural group is 
not denied by questioning the morality of a specific traditional practice, and nor 
would such questioning necessarily significantly deprive them of the moral 
values derived from cultural identification.   
 
As an example, in Zulu culture there are many traditional practices against 
which one would have no moral objections.  Many, if not most, of the elements 
that comprise a cultural identity have no moral implications, at all.  Traditional 
dances, music, art, and even many ceremonies and rites of passage are without 
any moral import.  A Zulu wedding ceremony may be very different from a 
Church wedding, and the form of marriage may be traditional and not covered 
by the Marriage Act, but this in no way renders it inferior or unacceptable.  To 
judge such a wedding as morally wrong purely because it is different, would not 
be acceptable.  Other cultural practices may have elements which are morally 
significant, and there is bound to be disagreement on whether these are 
acceptable or not.  The practice of lobola, or the paying of a bride price before 
marriage, is a case in point.  Some might be offended by the possible 
implication that the bride is being treated as a possession that can be sold.  On 
the other hand, some believe the practice both affirms the value of the bride, as 
well as cements the bond between the two families involved.  Now, it is 
possible to broadly affirm traditional Zulu marriage, and yet take exception to 
the practice of lobola.  Or, one can broadly affirm the annual reed dance, even if 
the spectacle of bare-breasted women in public would normally be seen to 
offend ideas of decency within one’s own culture.  (This might be an example 
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where Wong’s kind of relativism might make sense.)  But one might take moral 
exception to the practice of virginity testing which often precedes the ceremony.  
 
Since so many elements make up a culture, it is possible to acknowledge the 
importance of the moral goods derived from cultural identification for members 
of a culture, and still question the moral acceptability of some particular 
practices.  I am not denying the value of these moral goods, or disrespecting the 
people whose cultural practices differ from mine, if, in general, I affirm that I 
have no moral objection to most of the culture’s norms and practices, but judge 
some individual practices as morally questionable.  It cannot be claimed that 
members of a culture are being significantly robbed of the moral values they 
might derive from cultural identification because some people question the 
moral justifiability of a particular cultural practice. 
 
Having claimed that it is reasonable to assert that humans have as a minimum 
moral obligation not to cause animals unnecessary suffering, and having 
broadly accepted that the members of cultures have a legitimate claim to the 
social goods that are produced by their identification with and participation in 
their culture, I have argued the latter kinds of claims are morally less weighty 
than the former.  I have also argued that morally questioning a particular 
cultural act does not constitute significantly diminishing the social goods 
members of this culture can potentially obtain by participating in their culture.  
It therefore follows that the ritual slaughter of the kind performed by the 
Yengeni family is a prima facie wrong, and that claims based on the moral 
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value of cultural identification or participation are unable to outweigh this 
moral claim.   
  
Before concluding, I need to address a few possible objections to my argument.  
The first objection that I need to counter arises because of the species divide 
between the competing claims in this situation.  My analogy above, contrasting 
claims regarding the bodily integrity, survival and health of women, with 
cultural claims, pit one kind of moral obligation towards human beings against 
another.  Some might argue that when an obligation towards humans conflicts 
with an obligation towards animals, the claim for humans will always trump the 
animals’ claim.   Broadly, I agree with those who argue that we owe more to 
other adult, normal human beings, morally, than we owe to most other animals.  
Since defending this is not intrinsic to my project, I quote here just one defence 
of such a position, based on a concept of relative degrees of intrinsic worth:  
Thaddeus Metz writes: 
…if one must choose between driving over a cat or an innocent 
person, one should surely run over the cat.  I presume one 
should run over the cat not merely because one could go to jail, 
get sued, cause more pain, or make an uglier scene by striking 
the intelligent human.  Part of the explanation is that people are 
intrinsically worth more than cats.  Similar remarks apply, I 
believe, to a version of this thought experiment applied to cats 
and stones.  If one must choose between running over a cat and 
a pebble, one should choose the pebble.  To be sure, part of the 
initial explanation here is the pain one might cause the cat, but 
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factoring this element out (imagine the cat will die instantly), 
one still finds grounds for saving the cat; ordinary cats are 
worth more than ordinary stones. (Metz: 289).   
Granting this, then, do human interests always trump those of animals? 
 
To answer this, I turn to a another analogous example which is of relevance.  In 
her article “Animals and Accommodation” Paula Casal considers the case of 
ritual animal sacrifice amongst the Santería community of Southern Florida.  
This community practice a syncrestic religion combining elements of 
Catholicism and traditional African religion.  Central to their religious pratice is 
the regular sacrifice of animals, as they believe that their ancestral spirits cannot 
survive unless they are “fed” by these sacrifices (Casal: 246).  Claiming that 
between 15 000 and 18 000 animals a year are sacrificed by this community, 
Casal describes the method of slaughter used:  A priest holds the animal in one 
hand, and with the other inserts a short knife into one side of the animal’s neck, 
and pushes it through to the other side.  Casal claims that since there is a 
significant chance that both carotid arteries will not be severed at the same time, 
this is a particularly inhumane form of slaughter.  (Casal: 246).  Furthermore, 
she quotes Gary Francione’s description of the typical practice of slaughter: 
There are completely legitimate reasons to be concerned about 
Santería sacrifices, which are far more brutal than most other 
methods of slaughter…  Santería practitioners often completely 
saw the heads off larger animals, such as goats and sheep, and 
place the heads of birds and smaller animals under foot and 
then pull the animals until dismemberment occurs. Animals are 
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allowed to bleed to death very slowly and do not lose 
consciousness for extended periods of time.  They are often 
kept in filthy and inhumane conditions, and are deprived of 
food and water, for several days before the ceremony.  (Casal: 
251).   
Casal also claims that since the sacrifices may not be eaten, and are raised 
purely for the purpose of sacrifice, they are frequently badly fed, not raised 
hygienically and do not have their medical needs attended to.  (Casal: 247). 
 
Casal’s paper considers the issue from a legal perspective, which I have 
excluded from the scope of this paper, and which renders her argument rather 
irrelevant for my purposes.  However, the Santería community did seek legal 
protection of their practices, and special accommodation for them to practice 
this form of slaughter, which would otherwise be forbidden by local anti-cruelty 
legislation. (Casal: 247).   There are clearly moral claims underlying this 
demand for legal accommodation.  Again, we are faced with competing moral 
claims: animal anti-cruelty vs. culture.  What makes this case even more 
complex, however, is that the claims of the Santeros are not just based in 
culture, but on religion.  Furthermore, their treatment of animals in this way is 
not just for entertainment or other more trivial reasons, but is an essential 
requirement of their religious practice.  (Casal: 243). 
 
Here, then, we have a cultural minority claiming a right to practice a ritual 
required by their religion, which involves the frequent painful and gruesome 
maltreatment of sentient beings.  Does the fact that claims are made both to 
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religious freedom and cultural identification make any difference? Does the fact 
that this practice is a requirement of their religion make their treatment of 
animals any less immoral?  Do human interests automatically outweigh those of 
animals?  The scale and brutal nature of the maltreatment of animals in this case 
is surely enough to cause reasonable people to conclude that the way in which 
animals are treated by this community can only be immoral, and no cultural or 
religious interests can possibly make it any less immoral.  Claims based on 
religious freedom or cultural identification cannot possibly outweigh the wrong 
of the blatant torture of other sentient beings on a massive scale, repeatedly. 
 
To allow that any practice is granted moral legitimacy on the grounds that it is 
an intrinsic part of a culture (or, for that matter, a religion), and because human 
interests somehow trump those of animals would be to open the way for all 
kinds of possible terrible abuses of animals which do not seem to be reasonable 
to tolerate.  If human interests are always more morally weighty than those of 
animals, it could be argued that no amount of animal suffering can outweigh 
even a small and relatively unimportant human interest.  For example, massive 
cruelty to animals for the sake of human vanity would be “legitimised” on such 
a position.  As a matter of principle, the interests of people based on the moral 
values obtained through cultural identification - their sense of belonging, self-
esteem and recognition – are not morally significant enough to outweigh the 
moral illegitimacy of blatant cruelty.  Whilst it can be argued that the ritual 
slaughter practiced by South African cultural groups is far less cruel than that of 
the Santeros,  it remains cruel, and, thus, based on principle, still wrong. 
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A second objection to my argument that I wish to address is the claim that 
sometimes animals may need to be harmed for the sake of human interests.  
This is not to say that human interests always outweigh those of animals, but 
that they can possibly carry more moral weight.  If this is indeed so, my 
detractors would then possibly have grounds to argue that, because of a colonial 
and Apartheid past in which many of South Africa’s cultures were repressed 
and denigrated, the interests of these communities in the restoration of their 
dignity and self-esteem or cultural identification could outweigh the moral 
obligation not to harm animals in rituals of the type under consideration.   
 
Some kinds of vivisection, particularly for the testing of medicines, are often 
justified on these sorts of grounds.  Many would regard suffering caused to 
animals for this purpose as lamentable, but justified.  Since I have taken the 
position that we may owe more to humans morally than to animals, this could 
seem plausible.  Whilst I do not wish to launch a defence of animal 
experimentation, in cases where the health and, indeed, lives of large numbers 
of people could be preserved as a result of medicinal trials involving animal 
subjects, a case could be made that some animal suffering for this end might be 
morally justifiable.  To my mind, this would require the further condition that 
there would be no other means to perform this testing that would be as effective 
or cause less harm.  Given those conditions, I think a case could be made for 
morally defending the use of animals in this sort of way to promote human 
interests. 
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The important point though, is that what is at stake here is the health and lives 
of people.   This kind of justification of harm to animals is of a completely 
different kind from that based on the moral values inherent in cultural 
identification: the health of many people is a distinctly different kind of interest 
to these.  As I argued earlier, interests in survival, health, bodily integrity and 
such, carry more moral weight than the kinds of interests which are obtained 
through cultural identification and participation. It may be that human health 
and the saving of human life are weighty enough grounds to trump animal 
welfare.  The values of self-esteem, recognition, redress of past injustices, etc. 
cannot be seen as being as morally weighty as those of health and life.  I doubt 
that it can be argued that the harm done to people who experience having one 
aspect of their culture morally questioned by others is the same kind of harm as 
that of being seriously ill or dying.  The values inherent in cultural identification 
do not seem to provide  compelling enough reasons for justifying treating 
animals in ways which are otherwise immoral, not in the same in which the 
preservation of human life or curing of diseases might be argued to do.   Thus, I 
do not believe that ritual slaughter involving pain for animals can be defended 
on these grounds. 
 
Thirdly, I need to consider the possible objection that I have overlooked the real 
meaning and importance of the ritual under discussion.  This kind of ritual has 
an intrinsic meaning of its own, which is not solely about the values inherent in 
cultural identification.  Claims of this nature were made in the media debate 
over the Yengeni incident:  “[This] is about man's search for meaning, purpose 
and the redefinition of the relationship with the cosmos, God and his ancestry… 
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It is the… right of… communities to perform rituals that reconnect them to their 
ancestors. That promotes peace of mind in their lives....”   (IOL: “Yenegeni 
Ritual Spearheads Cultural Row”, 23 January 2007).  Those who practice this 
kind of sacrifice do so in the belief that it somehow brings healing and restores 
their spiritual standing with their ancestors.  The community experiences a 
sense of deep relief that all has been made well in their world because of this 
practice.  I can fully appreciate how much this aspect of the practice is 
experienced as deeply valuable to those who participate in it.   However, such 
practices are essentially symbolic.  There is no reason to believe that the 
practice could not be modified to exclude the maltreatment of animals, and still 
provide the community with all of the perceived value of healing and spiritual 
restoration derived from the current ritual practice.   Symbolic acts do not have 
intrinsic meaning.  We invest them with meaning.   Symbolically sparing an 
animal the ordeal and suffering of a sacrificial ritual, and possibly even sparing 
its life, could potentially constitute an even more powerful symbolic act of 
healing, as human beings, wishing to find healing and restoration after painful 
experiences, respond in an empathetic manner, recognising the interests of other 
sentient beings not to experience pain, either. 
 
Finally, it could be objected that my basic approach of weighing up the 
competing ethical claims for animals and culture is itself flawed.   A possible 
argument in favour of the moral justifiability of ritual slaughter is that the very 
nature and meaning of the act itself is changed because it is embedded within a 
significant cultural ritual.   Slaughter involving suffering outside of this context 
would be wrong, but the fact that this act takes place within this cultural 
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practice, changes the meaning of the act, and renders it morally justified.  One 
can easily see how this concept applies to sports and games.  There are board 
games in which part of the goal or strategy is to deceive your opponents 
successfully to your advantage.  Normally such deception would be morally 
wrong, but embedded within the context of playing a game, the meaning of 
such deception is radically altered.  What we ordinarily regard as deception is 
now merely a clever strategy or part of a game plan.  In this example, the reason 
for the difference in meaning between the two kinds of “deception” is easy to 
explain.  The context is a game.  The players all understand how the game 
works, and agree to the rules.  The “deception” which takes place is not real, 
because the agreed rules are different.   
 
I am unconvinced that the moral status of an act of ritual slaughter can be 
changed by virtue of its embeddedness within a cultural practice.   My 
detractors would have to show how this might work, as I can see no grounds for 
arguing that the rules change because an act is embedded in a cultural practice.  
Would ritual human sacrifice be any less immoral by virtue of its being 
embedded in a practice with significant cultural meaning?   For this objection to 
hold water, a good argument showing how cultural embeddedness could work 
to change the moral meaning of an act would have to be made.  As far as I can 
see, in the public debate surrounding the incident under discussion, no such 
argument was tendered, not even by those who most strongly claimed that such 
acts hold deep significance, spiritually and emotionally, for those who 
participate in them.  
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7.   Conclusion 
 
Since animal suffering is very likely to occur in ritual slaughters of the kind 
performed by the Yengeni family, it does not seem to me that this kind of act 
can be morally justified on the grounds that it is a traditional practice, central to 
the culture of the people involved.  At best, culture provides weak grounds for 
defending practices morally.  The interests of sentient beings not to be hurt must 
carry more moral weight than the interests of humans in the social goods or 
moral values derived from cultural identification and participation.  
Furthermore, taking moral exception to a particular cultural practice, and 
especially merely to one aspect of the practice cannot be construed as 
significantly denying those who perform this practice of the social goods or 
values derived from their cultural participation.  
 
The moral value or social goods derived form cultural practice are not 
significant enough to outweigh the prima facie wrong of harming animals in 
ritual sacrifices.  On these grounds I conclude that acts of the ritual slaughter of 
animals, of the kind recently engaged in by the Yengeni family are not morally 
justifiable.  
 
I have, thus far, excluded issues of the role of the law in situations such as this.  
In my concluding remarks, however, I wish to consider this angle.  I am not at 
all convinced that the best way to deal with this moral conflict is by means of 
legislation.  It is not always necessary to manage moral conflicts by means of 
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legal proscription.  Perhaps the best way forward is for those on both sides of 
this moral debate to enter into discussion with one another.   Perhaps a way can 
be found to accommodate the interests of cultures to experience the benefits of 
cultural identification as well as those of healing and restoration, without 
needing to cause animals unnecessary suffering.  Perhaps those who seek some 
kind of relief from their own painful experiences by means of ritual practices 
could find even more meaningful relief by modifying their cultural practices in a 
way which demonstrates their empathy with the suffering of other sentient 
beings.   
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